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I
INTRODUCTION

This article is written on the suppositions that the viability of shareholder
derivative suits is a vital support to the U.S. free enterprise economy, that derivative suits are the major policemen of managerial integrity, and that without derivative suits, passive equity investment could not flourish.' Other countries have
other disciplinary devices, 2 but the derivative suit is the preeminent disciplinary
device in the United States.
The article is written on some further suppositions of a more negative character-that a significant proportion of derivative suits are worse than useless, 3 that
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1. For classic indorsements of derivative suits, see the comments of Justice Frankfurter in Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) and of Judge Rifkind in Brendle v. Smith, 46 F.
Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far is Califormias
New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation.', 37 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1949); Carson, Current Phases of
Derivative Actions Agatist Dtrectors, 40 MICH. L. REV. 1125 (1942); Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 (1967).
2. See generally Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 4 (1973). In Germany, publicly held corporations are required
to have supervisory councils, in which executives cannot be members, which negotiate all transactions
between the corporation and executives. German Stock Corporation Law §§ 105, 112 (R. Mueller & E.G.
Galbraith trans. 2d ed. 1976).
In France, public companies must have independent auditors whose duties include ascertaining that
the shareholders receive equal treatment and reporting to the state prosecutor any violations of law that
come to their attention. French Law on Commercial Companies, art. 228, para. 3 & art. 233, para. 2
(1971); Tune, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
757, 760-61 (1982).
In Great Britain, where the shareholder's right to maintain a derivative suit is very limited, a shareholder may petition the court to cause an action to be brought in the company's name. Companies Act,
1980 ch. 22, § 75(4)(c).
In Canada, company laws have been amended within the past decade to forsake the traditional British
restrictions on derivative suits and permit them to be brought along lines similar to those authorized in the
United States. See Canadian Business Corporations Act, ch. 33, §§ 232, 233, 1974-76 Can. Stat. 709, 88687 (1975). Similar statutes have been enacted in several provinces. See Hansen, Annual Survey of Canadian
Law-Corporation Law, 10 OTTAwA L. REV. 617, 674-87 (1978).
In Australia, a shareholder may petition the court for an order regulating affairs of the company.
[Australian] Companies Act, 1981, § 320, AUSTL. ACTS P. no. 89 (1981).
3. As professors John Coffee and Donald Schwartz observe, recent developments restricting derivative
suits have not been preceded by any systematic demonstrations of their deleterious consequences. Coffee &
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUN. L.
REV. 261, 262 (1981). Nevertheless, an impression that a number of opportunistic suits were being filed
probably arose in the 1970's from the flurry of actions based on illegal foreign payments and political
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the dynamics of derivative suits tend to encourage useless as well as useful suits, 4
and that unless the useless suits can be selectively controlled, judges or legislators
5
will suppress the good with the bad.
These propositions are debatable, but this article does not debate them.
Rather, it addresses readers who consider them sufficiently plausible to justify
exploring means of winnowing out potential suits that would be useless while garnering those that would contribute to the corporate economy.
Policymakers cannot hope to winnow out at their inception all the suits that
will eventually fail. The suits that they can reasonably aspire to winnow are those
that are filed without more than a hope that evidence to sustain them will be
discovered or that defendants will settle to escape the burdens and embarrassment
of prolonged litigation. Policymakers may prudently seek also to induce the
prompt discontinuance of suits when initial expectations of ultimate success have
been dashed by the evidence that has been produced.
This article proposes that assessments against attorneys become the principal
device for winnowing derivative suits. To explain the reasons for this proposal,
this article begins by analyzing the costs and benefits of derivative suits and the
responsiveness of other winnowing devices to these costs and benefits.
contributions, which produced a temporary "litigation explosion." See Jones, An EmpiricalExamination of the
Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1917-1978, 60 B.U.L.

REV. 306, 322-23 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as Jones, Incidence]. In one suit of this type, which became a precedent for dismissal of
derivative suits, the facts had been brought to light by the company's own filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and there was no hint of the directors' having sought to serve any purpose other
than profits for shareholders. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). Similarly, in Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), the faults charged had been openly disclosed by directors and no selfdealing was involved.
Statistical evidence of useless shareholders' suits may be found in Jones, An Empirical Examinaton of the
Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

Jones, Resolution], even though it emphasizes the beneficial aspects of a majority of suits. More than 24% of
the suits in Jones' study terminated with no benefits-nominal or otherwise-to the corporation; of the
more than 75% that were terminated favorably to the plaintiff, the amount of benefit is known in less than
a quarter; the benefits in some cases within this quarter may well have been less than the corporation's
costs. Id at 545-62. Jones' data do not separate shareholders' derivative suits from shareholders' class suits.
4. Defendants have strong incentives to settle, even when they believe that their chances of prevailing
in a final judgment are very good. Usually they can settle for less than the litigation costs of continuing the
suit. Under indemnification laws like those of Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1975), the
corporation can indemnify the officers for litigation expenses and settlements when cases are settled but not
when the officers are adjudged liable. Continuation of the suit exposes the officers to unfavorable publicity
no matter how it is finally decided. Cf Jones, Resolution, supra note 3, at 567.
For plaintiffs' attorneys, prolonging lawsuits costs time, but not much money out of pocket; the possibilities of receiving generous fee awards depends more on defendants' impulsions to settle than on plaintiffs' chances of winning.
5. In 1944 and succeeding years, New York and other states adopted requirements of security for
expenses that were expected to curb derivative suits drastically. See Dykstra, supra note 1, at 88-89; Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944); House,
Stockholders' Suits and the Coudert-Mitchell Laws, 20 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 377 (1945). The 1979 decision of

Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, was seen by some commentators
as another death knell to derivative suits. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 284; Dent, The Power of
Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 107-09
(1980). But cf. Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suits. A Critique of Zapata and the ALl

Project, 1982 Duke L.J. 959.
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II
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DERIVATIVE SUITS

To decide which suits should be garnered and which ones winnowed out,
policymakers need to have some idea of the costs and benefits that may flow from
these suits. Case law has frequently examined costs and benefits for the purpose of
awarding attorney fees. In that context, costs are attorneys' work hours, and benefits are money paid into the corporate treasury or savings of money that would,
without the suit, have been paid out. But there are many other ways of looking at
costs and benefits, some of which have escaped attention because prevailing case
law does not call for their calculation.
Policymakers need a more comprehensive view. With regard to benefits, they
should contemplate not only gains of corporations on whose behalf suits are filed,
but benefits enjoyed by other sectors of society. With regard to costs, they should
consider not only the payments made by corporations and defendants, but also the
diversion of time and resources and the shifting of costs to consumers, taxpayers,
and others.
Discussion of these variables can be confusing because the persons aligned as
defendants in derivative suits include not only the persons against whom sanctions
are sought but also the corporation on whose behalf the suit is filed. In this article,
"defendants" will signify only the persons against whom sanctions are sought; the
corporation on whose behalf the suit is filed will be called the "represented
corporation."
A.

A Public Policy Perspective

1. Costs. From a public policy perspective, the cost of a derivative suit may be
compared with the plume of a smokestack which dumps concentrated deposits
over a small area near the stack and progressively more diffuse deposits as the
distance from the stack increases. The most immediate fallout in derivative suits
will be the fees of lawyers and other litigation participants. These are initially
paid in varying proportions by the represented corporation, by defendant officers
and directors, by insurance companies, and occasionally by plaintiffs. A less conspicuous but equally immediate cost of the derivative suit will be consumption of
the time of the corporate officers and directors and their staffs and the consequent
diversion of their best efforts from production and distribution.
But the fallout of expenses will not always rest where it first falls. Attorney fees
disbursed by corporations will become part of the costs that diminish returns to
investors, diminish compensation to employees, or increase prices to consumers,
depending on which relationship is most vulnerable. Attorney fees disbursed by
defendant officers will be partly reimbursed by the corporation or by insurance
companies; those that are not reimbursed will enter into the compensation that
corporations must pay to future officers or into the insurance premiums that corporations must pay for the protection of officers. Attorney fees disbursed by insurance companies will also be reflected in the premiums that nearly all corporations
will pay for officers' and directors' liability insurance. Consequently, most of the
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attorney fees paid will enter into the costs of doing business and will be spread
throughout the economy like other costs.
There will be still more remote and less measurable costs. To ward off derivative suits, directors will to some extent avoid making decisions that they would
otherwise regard as advantageous to the corporation but which seem to involve
dangers of derivative suits against themselves. When they do not avoid decisions,
they will to some extent engage in a series of protective rituals such as obtaining
the written opinions of "experts" who confirm their views and taking votes of "disinterested directors" and of shareholders in order to immunize their decisions from
attacks on the ground of conflicts of interest. These rituals will contribute to the
employment of lawyers and the inflation of operating costs.
Among the least tangible of costs will be the effect of the suit on the reputation
of the corporation involved and of corporations in general. Most derivative suits
involve charges of disloyal conduct by officers or directors in their own self interest
or in the interest of the segment of shareholders that they represent. Whether true
or false, the charges impair the confidence of employees, consumers, and voters in
the integrity of corporate management. If employees, consumers, and voters
believe that corporate managers betray even their own shareholders, they can be
expected to distrust managers, particularly managers of defendant corporations, in
other contexts. As a result, these constituencies will disbelieve what managers say
about their abilities to pay wages, improve products, or reduce pollution.
2. Benefits. In a pattern similar to that observed with costs, benefits to the represented corporation begin with some clearly visible gains. The most obvious benefit
will be money paid by or on behalf of defendants to the corporate treasury. More
remote benefits will often be found in future savings that are expected to result
from discontinuance of the practices that occasioned the suit.
Beyond these measurable gains will be the admonitory effects on future decisions. Directors, officers, and others who have been made to pay back their gains,
to pay their lawyers, and to suffer the humiliation of unfavorable judgments or
settlements will be more circumspect in the future. What is more important,
officers of other corporations, admonished by their counsel, will take heed. As a
result, investors in all corporations may realize greater returns; to the extent that
they do, investment will be encouraged, expenses of corporations reduced, and
productivity enhanced.
More remotely, maintenance of discipline among corporate executives will elevate the public perception of executives and will enhance their credibility in all
their relations with employees, consumers, and voters.
Whether the enhancement of public confidence through enforcement of standards of managerial behavior outweighs the deterioration caused by exposure is a
complicated question. It is somewhat like the question whether the Watergate
exposure increased or diminished confidence in government. The short-term
effects of derivative suits on public confidence are clearly negative, especially for
the represented corporation. The long-term effects on confidence may be beneficial, but these gains will be slower in coming to the represented corporation than

Page 269: Winter 19841

WINNOWING DERIVATIVE SUITS

to others. In this respect, derivative suits tend to make the represented corporation
and its constituencies pay for benefits that will be reaped in greater measure by
other corporations and their constituencies.
B.

The Perspective of Disinterested Directors

According to a doctrine of recent florescence, a shareholder's derivative suit
will be dismissed on motion of the corporation if disinterested directors find that
the maintenance of the suit is not in the "best interests of the corporation." '6 The
factors that should be weighed in determining the corporation's best interests have
not yet been settled. One of the clearest statements of what the disinterested directors have in fact considered is found in the New York decision of Auerbach v. Bennett. 7 The plaintiff complained that corporate directors had approved or
acquiesced in paying bribes to foreign government officials, thereby wasting the
corporation's money and exposing it to penalties. A litigation committee composed of disinterested directors was appointed and concluded after investigation
and consultation:
that none of the individual defendants had violated the New York State statutory standard
of care, that none had profited personally or gained in any way, that the claims asserted in
the present action are without merit, that if the action were allowed to proceed the time
and talents of the corporation's senior management would be wasted on lengthy pretrial
and trial proceedings, that litigation costs would be inordinately high in view of the unlikelihood of success, and that the continuing publicity could be damaging to the corporation's
8
business.

From this passage, as well as from the general "best interests of the corporation"
standard itself, one may infer that the costs and benefits to be considered by a
directors' litigation committee are considerably narrower than those that should
concern a lawmaker. On the cost side, the doctrine probably contemplates only
the charges that will be disbursed by the corporation for its own defense or (by
way of indemnity) for the defense of its officers and directors. It probably does not
contemplate the charges that will be defrayed by liability insurance companies
and will enter indirectly into the operating expenses of the represented corporation
and all other corporations that buy similar insurance. Likewise, the loss of business that enters into the balance is only the loss of the represented corporation, not
that of other corporations that share the obloquy (as Boeing may share the hostility generated by Lockheed's bribery).
On the benefit side, the only element referred to in the Auerbach opinion is the
money that might be paid into the corporate treasury if guilty directors were successfully sued. Money saved by changes in managerial practices would probably
be considered too, since it is often recognized in decisions on the amount of awards
to plaintiffs' counsel. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that considerations
6. Dismissal on recommendation of disinterested directors seems to have been first recognized in the
United States in Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952), but was largely ignored in
legal literature and in the practice until the flurry of cases embracing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979),
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), and Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
7. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
8. Id.at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
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would include the beneficial admonitory effects on managerial responses to future
temptations in the represented corporation. Clearly, no consideration would be
given to admonitory effects on conduct of directors in other corporations. Likewise, there is no suggestion of credit for the gain in confidence that might result
from a visible cleanup in corporate affairs.
In Delaware, disinterested directors are expected to make their decision on the
same basis as in New York, but the court in which the motion for dismissal is made
may review the decision on broader grounds. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado the
court quoted with approval a federal court's framing of the question in these
words: "The final substantive judgment whether a particular lawsuit should be
maintained requires a balance of many factors-ethical, commercial, promotional,
public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as legal." 9 The court reinforced
this broad view of the components of the decision by stating, "[t]he Court of Chancery should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and
public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests."' 0 But the Second
Circuit, while adopting the Delaware view that the court should reach its own
decision on dismissal, adopted a valuation scheme much like that of Auerbach. I
Under both the New York and Delaware views, the balance of costs and benefits apparently relates to the question whether the derivative suit should continue
to be maintained rather than whether it should have been started. 2 The difference, which may be substantial, is illustrated by Lewis v. Anderson.' 3 In this case,
the filing of a derivative suit was followed by appointment of a litigation committee, which recommended that the directors' actions of which the plaintiff complained be submitted to the shareholders for ratification.1 4 Upon ratification, the
9. 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), modzifd, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982)).
10. Id at 789. It is possible that this broader review of the disinterested directors' decision will be
made only in cases in which a prior demand was excused because the board had no majority of disinterested directors. See id at 784 n. 10.
11. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Connecticut law), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1498 (1983). The only benefit recognized was the amount of recoverable damages. The costs to be
considered were corporate expenditures for attorney fees, corporate indemnification of defendants'
expenses, diversion of executives' efforts, and loss of profits through unfavorable publicity.
12. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 785:
The question to be decided becomes: When, if at all, should an authorized board committee be permitted to cause litigation, properly initiated by a derivative stockholder in his own right, to be dismissed? . . . Even when demand is excusable, circumstances may arise when continuation of the
litigation would not be in the corporation's best interest.
Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926:
Then subsequent to the service of the complaint there came the report of a special litigation committee, particularly appointed by the corporation's board of directors to consider the merits of the
present and similar shareholders' derivative actions, and its determination that it would not be in the
best interests of the corporation to press claims against defendants based on their possible first-tier
liability.
See also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983): "Where the
court determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the probability of a finding of liability
are less than the costs to the corporation in continuing the action, it should dismiss the case."
13. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). The issue of attorney fees was
subsequently litigated in Lewis v. Anderson (II), 509 F. Supp. 232 (C.D. Cal. 1981), afd, 692 F.2d 1267
(9th Cir. 1982).
14. Lewis (II), 509 F. Supp. at 234.
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committee decided that further prosecution of the litigation would not be in the
company's best interests.' 5 Plaintiff concluded he could not prove the lack of good
faith or independence on the part of the committee necessary for the litigation thus
to proceed but joined his motion for dismissal with prejudice with a petition for a
fee award. 16 The court awarded a fee because the filing of the suit had had a
beneficial effect in vindicating the shareholders' right to be consulted, although the
further maintenance of the suit, after the shareholders' ratification of directors'
1 7
action, would not have served any corporate interest.
In contrast, a derivative suit may have negligible potential for conferring a net
benefit, even when the acts of which it complains were clearly wrong. In
Ambramowztz v. Posner,1 8 the corporation had taken corrective action before the
plaintiff even made a preliminary demand. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had obtained a consent decree for the repayment of $600,000, and
an audit committee had recommended that the corporation demand an additional
$1,000,000 from the defendants.1 9 The plaintiff's suit seems to have been an
attempt to climb on a bandwagon that was already rolling.
C.

The Perspective of the Wood Report

Although ink has flowed freely for a century on the pros and cons of derivative
suits, there have been few examinations of their vital statistics. The first systematic
survey was the Wood report of 1944.20
The outstanding disclosure of this report was that a majority of derivative suits
result in dismissal or discontinuance without any possible benefit to the represented corporation, while a very small percent result in plaintiffs' victories, and an
intermediate percent result in settlements of varying value. 2 1 Wood noted the
minuscule amounts of benefits to plaintiff shareholders, 22 which he contrasted with
large awards to plaintiffs' attorneys. 23 His conception of benefits to shareholders
seems to have been limited to cash gains to the treasury. He observed that most of
the significant contributions to corporate treasuries resulted from correction of
unintentional errors of directors, implying that the suits could have few admoni24
tory effects.
D.

The Perspective of the Jones Report

The most recent light on the outcomes of derivative suits has been cast by the
report of a survey by Thomas M. Jones based on cases occurring in the 1970's.25
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Special
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id at 235.
Id
Id at 238.
672 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id
F. Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders' Derivative Suits (1944) (prepared for the
Committee on Corporate Litigation, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York).
Id at 32-35.
Id at 49-54.
Id at 78-84.
Id at 36-43.
Jones, Incidence, supra note 3, at 306; Jones, Resolution, supra note 3, at 542.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 47: No. I

All of the corporations surveyed were subject to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 193426 and were therefore required to report publicly the outcomes of derivative
suits and the major elements of settlement agreements. The study did not include
closely held corporations, which comprised a majority of those covered by the
Wood report.
The Jones report showed that in the 1970's, as in the 1930's, most of the sur27
veyed suits were settled without going to final judgment of recovery or dismissal.
Unlike the Wood report, the Jones report disclosed the content of the settlements
and found that most of them involved some specific benefit to the represented
2
corporation.
Jones' report, like Wood's, 29 showed that very few suits came to final judgment
for the plaintiffs. Jones' percentage of plaintiffs' judgments was 0.6%,30 lower than
3
Wood's 2% for publicly held corporations and 5% for closely held corporations. '
On the other hand, Jones found a much higher percent of suits that won something for the represented corporations-a total of more than 75%.32 Roughly 71%
were settled with some benefit, 4% ended with defendants conforming to plaintiffs'
demands, and 0.6% ended with contested judgments for plaintiffs. 33 The settlements generally included some restitution to the corporation or an injunction or
agreement prohibiting future misfeasances plus occasionally a structural change
such as appointment of independent directors. 34 Jones inferred that these suits
were beneficial on balance, viewing reforms in corporate governance as the most
significant consequence. 35 He did not give any express consideration to costs in
defendants' attorney fees, in diversion of executives' time, in augmentation in the
corporation's payments for insurance and for compensation of officers and directors, or in the corporation's loss of repute.
The fact that consent judgments contain some payments and injunctions is not
very conclusive as to a beneficial balance when one considers that under court
supervision a settlement can hardly be made without these elements. There is a
substantial possibility that some suits lead to settlements not because of their
merits but because of the plaintiffs ability to harass the corporation with endless
demands for discovery. Jones' report disclosed that in many cases the measured
benefits were quite modest, 36 although he emphasized the large size of a small
37
minority of settlements.
Jones also showed that a significant minority of suits-about 20%--ended in
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981)).
Jones, Resolution, supra note 3, at 545.
Id at 547-62.
F. Wood, supra note 20, at 32.
Jones, Resolution, supra note 3, at 545.
F. Wood, supra note 20, at 32.
Jones, Resolution, supra note 3, at 545.
Id
Id at 547-62.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 530-51.
Id at 547-62.
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dismissal with no recovery and no settlement. 38 He made no further comment on
these suits or on their implications for the state of the law on derivative suits.
The combination of Jones' cases where nothing was recovered with those that
were settled with small direct benefits leaves a strong suspicion that some suits
that should be deterred are not now being stopped. On the other hand, the evidence is impressive that a substantial number of filed suits are beneficial. One
would like to know whether there are also potential suits that would be beneficial
if filed, but no survey throws any light on this question.
III
WINNOWING WITHOUT FEE CONTROL

Lawmakers, including judicial rulemakers, have been engaged for approximately a century in devising means of winnowing out derivative suits that will be
more detrimental than beneficial. We will consider first the methods that are not
centered on fees.
A.

Winnowing by Characterization

The earliest kind of winnower was one that characterizes some categories of
plaintiffs as being more likely to file meritless than meritorious claims. The contemporaneous ownership rule is an early example of this mode. It first appeared as
39
a device for preventing the fabrication of diversity of citizenship in federal courts
4°
but has now been adopted by state courts as a merit-selector.
In closely held
corporations the contemporaneous ownership rule must be a powerful eliminator
since old friends and relatives of abusive managers will be slow to attack them.
But that does not make it a good selector; it probably protects some perpetrators of
41
outrageous mismanagement.
In publicly held corporations, the rule is largely inoperative since a contemporaneous shareholder can usually be found even if the principal instigator is not
one. But the rule may become operative when the publicly held corporation
42
becomes private through a takeover of all or most of its shares.
Another kind of winnowing by characterization occurs when the suit is dismissed because the plaintiff has "dirtied his hands" by participating in the
wrongful acts or because the plaintiff had a confidential relationship with the perpetrators. 43 These dismissals presumably teach moral lessons to plaintiffs but have
38.

Id at 545.

39.

Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).

40.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963); MODEL

BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 49 (1979).
41. Cf Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivatve Suits, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1041 (1978).

42. See Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), in which a suit
brought by the corporation itself was dismissed because 98.3% of the shares had been sold since the misfeasance occured. Whether the other 1.7% of the shareholders could have maintained a suit was not discussed.
43. See Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973) (former counsel who had advised corporation's executives barred from maintaining derivative
action against those executives); Connors v. Conners Bros. Co., 110 Me. 428, 86 A. 843 (1913) (former
treasurer who had disbursed funds for bribes could not maintain derivative suits against other executives
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no value in separating meritorious complaints from meritless ones. On the contrary, confidants and confederates are likely to have convincing evidence at their
disposal.
An attenuated form of winnowing by characterization is found in the requirement that security for expenses be posted by holders of securities worth less than a
set dollar amount (e.g., $50,000) 4 4 or of fewer securities than a set percentage of
shares (e.g., 5%).45 Shareholders who are below these thresholds are subject to
burdensome security requirements that presumably deter some of them from
suing. In practice, the security requirement has not had much effect in publicly
held corporations because courts have allowed plaintiffs to meet the threshold by
aggregating holdings, including holdings of plaintiffs who join after the suit is
filed, 46 but the requirement is likely to be a powerful eliminator in closely held
corporations when other shareholders who would be willing to join cannot be
found.
While each of the characterization devices serves some intelligible purpose,
none of them is well suited to distinguishing meritorious derivative suits from meritless ones. The fact that a plaintiff has recently bought his shares, was formerly a
confederate of the defendants, or holds few shares has no logical correlation with
any balance of costs and benefits of a suit on behalf of the corporation against
accused defendants.
B.

Winnowing by Preliminary Judicial Evaluation

Under California law, a defendant can call for a preliminary determination of
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the suit will benefit
the corporation and its shareholders. In form, he moves for an order that the
plaintiff furnish security. 47 If the court finds that the plaintiff has no reasonable
possibility of success, the plaintiff must furnish security. The decision usually
determines whether the suit will continue, since plaintiffs are unlikely to furnish
security after the court in which they must prosecute has decided that there is no
reasonable possibility of their winning.
The suits that are winnowed out by this device probably deserve their fate.
From the reported cases, it appears that the judge examines voluminous docuwho had arranged and paid bribes). But cf Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 112 Colo. 331, 149 P.2d
653 (1944) (rejecting defense of unclean hands).
44. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83) (authorizing a requirement for security
unless the plaintiff owns either 5% of a class of shares or shares worth $50,000).
45. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.405(4) (West 1957) (authorizing a security requirement unless plaintiffs
hold 3% of a class of shares, without any dollar threshold).
46. See Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits. 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 50, 62-63 (1968).
47. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (West Supp. 1983). The motion to require bond may be based on
either or both of the following grounds:
(1) That there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the cause of action alleged in the
complaint against the moving party will benefit the corporation or its shareholders.
(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not participate in the transaction
complained of in any capacity.
The statute further authorizes hearings at which written and oral evidence may be received and considered. Id at § 800(d).
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ments and depositions before reaching a decision; 48 one opinion refers to 810
49
pages of oral testimony.
But the procedure is unlikely to spare corporations most of the expense of baseless suits. To determine whether the suit has a reasonable possibility of benefit, the
judge must examine most of the same evidence that he would examine in order to
decide the case on its merits. 50

Consequently, the defendants incur most of the

expenses of a lawsuit before the suit can be dismissed.
Also, in relatively few suits will the judge be able to determine that no reasonable possibility of benefit exists; if the plaintiff can produce affidavits creating substantial questions of fact, the case will go forward. In the cases where security has
been required, the court has found that on the conceded facts the plaintiff had no
cause of action.
In the cases that go forward, the defendants will have to produce at the trial
the same evidence that has already been reviewed in the ruling on security. In
effect, the defendants' motions for security will have subjected them to two trials
instead of one. Far from deterring the filing of baseless suits, the procedure gives
plaintiffs opportunities to test their cases without incurring any liability for
defendants' costs.
C.

Winnowing by Decision of Disinterested Directors

The newest development in the regulation of derivative suits is dismissal on
motion of the corporation pursuant to a finding by a litigation committee composed of disinterested directors that the maintenance of the suit is not in the corporation's best interests. 5 1 The principal merit of this device is its potential for
getting rid of suits of which the principal purpose is embarrassment of the executives involved. This potential has been nicely illustrated in some cases charging
officers and directors with acts that had already been the subject of investigation
52
and recommendation by internal committees and even of reports to the SEC.
How this device will be articulated in later cases remains to be seen. It appears
to have two inherent shortcomings.
The primary weakness of reliance on a litigation committee's decision is its
propensity for bringing about dismissal of beneficial suits as well as of detrimental
48. See Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 171, 22 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1962); Thomas v.
Summers Gyroscope Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 234, 324 P.2d 893 (1958); Olson v. Basin Oil Co., 136 Cal. App.
2d 543, 288 P.2d 952 (1955).
49. Thomas v. Summers Gyroscope Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 234, 240, 324 P.2d 893, 897 (1958).
50. See cases cited supra note 48.
51. See supra note 6.
52. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs demand had been preceded by
a consent decree in favor of the SEC ordering repayment of $600,000 and by an adult committee recommendation to seek repayment of additional sums); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(litigation committee investigated payments and found the chief executive had earlier ordered discontinuance); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441
U.S. 471 (1979) (directors had already sued and recovered a settlement of more than $5,000,000 on account
of the incident involved); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979)
(illegal payments had been previously investigated by an audit committee and reported to shareholders
and to the SEC); cf Rosengarten v. IT&T Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (questionable payments had been previously reported to shareholders).
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ones. 53 In contemplating the costs of continuing the suit, committee members will
be appalled by the prospective legal expenses of the corporation and of the
defendant directors and by the diversion of executives' time from more productive
activities. They will perceive themselves as able to obtain from the defendant
directors all the restitution and changes of practice that a court would eventually
order, and at much less cost. If the other directors have been prescient, they will
have delegated authority to the committee to decide not only on continuance of
the suit, but also on remedial measures to be carried out within the corporation.
Under the New York rule, as formulated in the Auerbach case, 54 even the most
meritorious suits seem sure to be dismissed, with the consequence that similar suits
will no longer be filed. Whether the same result will follow in Delaware will
depend on how the courts' own business judgments are exercised.
The second weakness of dismissal on the motion of disinterested directors arises
because considerable expense and diversion of resources are incurred before the
case is dismissed. These costs will be felt most sharply in Delaware, where a court
will review the costs and benefits of maintaining the suit before making its decision
on dismissal. 55 To make this review, the court will be required to examine volumes
of written evidence, and perhaps hear witnesses, while corporate executives and
attorneys for the corporation will have to marshal evidence. As under the California procedure for a preliminary determination of probability of success, 56 there
will be a minitrial to decide whether there should be a full trial. The meritless suit
will still impose heavy costs on the corporation and indirectly on its investors,
employees, or customers.
Even in New York, where the courts are instructed to examine only the disinterest of the litigation committee, the examination may be extensive. As the
Court of Appeals observed,
What evidentiary proof may be required to this end will, of course, depend on the nature of
the particular investigation, and the proper reach of disclosure at the instance of the shareholders will in turn relate inversely to the showing made by the corporate representatives
themselves. The latter may be expected to show that the areas and subjects to be examined
and that there has been a good-faith pursuit of inquiry into such
are reasonably complete
57
areas and subject.

In summary, the decision of independent directors appears to be an ineffective
means of winnowing derivative suits. This device will eliminate many meritorious
suits by reason of the deference paid by judges to the opinions of "independent"
directors. Meritorious suits that might surmount this hurdle will be impeded by
the expense of the double trial-one to decide whether the suit proceeds and the
other to decide whether it prevails.
53. Cf Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 280-300; Cox, supra note 5, at 962-63; Dent, supra note 5, at
109; Steinberg, The Use ofSpecial Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder DervativeSuits, 35 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1 (1980).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
55. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see discussion supra text accompanying
notes 9-10.
56. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
57. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1979).
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IV
WINNOWING

A.

By

FEE AWARD AND ASSESSMENT PRACTICES

Dynamics of Fee Practices

The winnowing devices discussed above operate to facilitate the dismissal of
meritless suits. They do not work very well, partly because plaintiffs' lawyers are
still willing to take long chances of winning, partly because they do not save
defendants from expense in obtaining dismissals, and partly because defendants
sometimes prefer settling to incurring the costs of obtaining dismissal.
Fee practices, in contrast, operate on the motivations of attorneys in filing and
maintaining suits. When fee considerations prevent the initial filing of the suit,
defendants are spared even preliminary expenses. By motivating attorneys to
refrain from filing meritless suits, the possibility of fee shifting invokes the judgment of the attorneys themselves to determine whether they will be found to have
filed in the expectation of winning or of extracting a nuisance settlement.
Fee orders are made at the conclusion of a suit after all the evidence has been
heard. Instead of guessing in advance which of the allegations will be sustained by
testimony, the judge knows which allegations were sustained in actuality. Fee
orders are retrospective with regard to the suit in which they are made, but they
have prospective effect on suits to be filed in the future because they affect attorneys' decisions to file or not to file.
This article examines how the ways in which fee practice can be made to
diminish the incentives for, and provide deterrents to, the filing of derivative suits
that lack merit.
B.

Winnowing by Controlling Awards to Plaintiffs' Attorneys

To most onlookers, the strongest incentive for the filing of derivative suits
without regard to their merits is the enormity of fee awards that occasionally make
the headlines; one award of nearly $2,000,000 is on record. 58 These huge fee
awards raise two quesions-whether they create incentives for filing suits that lack
merit, and whether they are larger than necessary to motivate the filing of suits
that are meritorious.
It seems inherently likely that high awards motivate the filing of suits that lack
merit. If attorneys and judges were completely wise, fee awards would not have
this effect, since judges would refuse to make awards in meritless suits, and attorneys, knowing the judges' policies, would not file the suits. But in a world in which
merits and probabilities are hard to measure, fees that exceed normal returns for
hours of work are likely to motivate the filing of forlorn causes. To minimize the
temptation to file suits with little merit, awards in the meritorious suits should be
held to the minima that are necessary to induce suits that are meritorious.
One source of excessive fees is the award calculated as a percentage of the
58. Zenn v. Anzalone, 46 Misc. 2d 378, 259 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965). For a compilation of
reported awards, see Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Hornstein Revi ited, 6 U.
RICH. L. REv. 259, 283-85 (1972).
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benefit conferred on the represented corporation.5 9 When millions of dollars are
involved, as is often the case in derivative suits, customary percentages may result
in fees that reward attorneys for their time at a rate far greater than they could
earn in any other line of legal work. 60 One can hardly doubt that these awards
61
inspire filing some long-shot lawsuits.
Percentage awards are sometimes defended on the ground that they are presumably fair, since they are calculated in the same way as contingent fees to which
personal injury claimants subscribe of their own free will. This rationale is obviously insufficient. The market for the services of personal injury lawyers is not so
open and informed that one needs to have any faith in the fitness of the rates
charged. Even if percentage compensation is appropriate for individual lawsuits,
it is not likely to be equally fitting for corporate lawsuits where the amounts
involved are multiplied by the thousands of investors whose interests may be
affected. Finally, appropriate compensation for services voluntarily purchased has
no necessary relation to appropriate compensation for services that are rendered to
involuntary beneficiaries (the passive shareholders) or resisting beneficiaries (the
represented corporations). In the law of restitution, officious intermeddling is gen62
erally not compensated at all.
Courts are generally cognizant of the inefficiency of percentage awards; the
past decade has witnessed a strong movement toward basing fees on hours of work
devoted to the case. 63 This approach introduces two problems-the setting of the
hourly rate and its multiplication on account of difficulty or risk.
Sometimes the hourly rate is set at the "prevailing rate" that is generally
earned by other attorneys in the same kind of work. 64 This formula leads the court
to an extensive exploration of the earnings of attorneys who are established practitioners in the area, tempered by a difficult evaluation of the experience and reputation of the petitioning attorney.
Forsaking "prevailing rates," courts sometimes take the petitioner's customary
"billing rate." 65 The opinions do not show just how the billing rate is proved.
Many firms that file derivative suits derive most of their income from other representative and contingent fee suits, so that they have few occasions to bill. 66 The
59. The percentage method was generally taken as basic until the late 1970's. See Cole, supra note 58,
at 270; Dawson, Lawyers andInvoluntary Clients in Ptblic Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849, 876 (1975);
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV.658 (1956).
60. See Ripley v. International Rys., 16 A.D.2d 260, 227 N.Y.S.2d 64, afdmem., 12 N.Y.2d 814, 187
N.E.2d 131, 236 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1962); Zenn v. Anzalone, 46 Misc. 2d 378, 259 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
The movement from percentages to value of hours worked seems to have been touched off by some direct
class actions for antitrust violations, where benefits were estimated in the tens of millions or hundreds of
millions of dollars. See Hammond, Stringent New Standardsfor Awards of Attorney's Fees, 32 Bus. LAW 523
(1977); Herzel and Hagan, Plaintif'Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class Actions, 7 LITIGATION 25 (1981);
Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Actions and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267, 334-48 (1978).
6 1. Cf Dawson, supra note 59, at 929: "The court-directed game of roulette that has thus emerged has
the same attractions for the adventurous lawyer as those to be found in other games of chance."
62. Cf Dawson, supra note 59, at 857.
63. See generally Mowrey, supra note 60, at 334-48; Hammond, supra note 60.
64. See, e.g., Tranberg v. Tranberg, 456 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1972).
65. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
66. Cf Hammond, supra note 60, at 527; Mowrey, supra note 60, at 324-25.
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rate at which they bill Exxon or Prudential on the rare occasions when these corporations employ them is a poor indication of the rate of compensation that would
induce them to file meritorious derivative suits. A better indication would be the
firm's business income, as shown on a tax return, divided by the number of hours
available for client service.
After choosing a base rate, courts sometimes multiply it in order to compensate
plaintiffs' attorneys for the chance that a suit, although meritorious, will not succeed. 67 If an excessive rate has been chosen, multiplying it compounds the error.
If, however, a realistic rate has been chosen, some multiplication is appropriate.
The question of how much to multiply is a difficult one which can barely be
touched on here. 68 Multiples up to four have been used, although multiples of 1.5
or less are more common. 69 A plausible argument can be made for multiples up to
1.99 on the ground that attorneys should be encouraged to file suits that have
better than an even chance of succeeding. In representative suits, where the prospective beneficiaries are unwilling or involuntary, one can hardly argue for
bringing suits at the beneficiaries' expense which have no better than an even
chance of helping them.
If meritless derivative suits continue to be filed and maintained even after all
the excesses have been squeezed out of awards to plaintiffs' attorneys, judges
should not conclude that awards have not been squeezed enough. Some attorneys
will still overestimate their chances of winning. After they have invested time in
the initial preparation and filing, they will weigh their chances of winning not
against their total investment, but against the incremental investment that might
possibly bring forth a settlement offer. If the first increment of effort is unproductive, the temptation to salvage the prior efforts by one more increment is hard to
resist, and so the hopeless case will drag on and on. Courts cannot control this
phenomenon merely by reducing awards in meritorious cases; they need to apply
deterrents to cases that lack merit.
C.

Winnowing by Assessment Against Nominal Plaintiffs

Critics recurrently suggest that courts in the United States should adopt the
"English Rule" making plaintiffs liable for defendants' attorneys' fees when
defendants win their cases. Translating the English rule to practice in the United
States would be complex, since the fees for which English losers become liable are
70
more strictly controlled than the fees that U.S. lawyers charge their clients.
Even if a reasonable scale of assessable fees could be established, the system
would probably not be a useful selector. One basic difficulty is that plaintiffs
cannot fairly be blamed for unjustified suits. Their lawyers are the ones who can
tell, if anyone can, whether a suit is justified.7 1 Nominal plaintiffs are unlikely to
67.

Hammond, supra note 60, at 528; Mowrey, supra note 60, at 339.

68.

For a deeper exploration, see Leubsdorf, The Contngency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J.

473 (1981).
69. See Mowrey, supra note 60, at 339 & n.515.
70. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856-58 (1929).
71. See Rothenberg v. Security Management Corp., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
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overrule their attorneys when the plaintiffs' stakes are so much smaller than the
corporation's cause of action. Penalizing plaintiffs may teach them to distrust lawyers, but will not have much effect on the filing of derivative suits because few
plaintiffs are repeaters; it is their lawyers who must learn the lesson.
If judges feel this way about assessing fees against plaintiffs, they will find ways
of avoiding assessments. Out of a mass of charges, they will find one that justifies
the suit. Minuscule justifications of this sort are recurrently encountered in decisions awarding fees to plaintiffs' counsel who have won on only one or two minor
issues.

D.

72

Winnowing by Requiring Security for Attorneys' Fees

The Wood report of 1944 was quickly followed by a wave of legislation
73
The
requiring certain plaintiffs to post security for defendants' attorneys' fees.
characterization of plaintiffs who are and who are not impaled on this requirement
has already been addressed, and attention is now directed to its efficiency as a
selector among those who are impaled. The legislative supposition, if rational,
must have been that the impaled plaintiffs with meritorious suits would post their
bonds and press ahead while plaintiffs with meritless claims would abandon
them.

4

We have no data on how the law has affected the behavior of plaintiffs who did
not succeed in circumventing the security requirement by aggregating sufficient
holders, and very little evidence of how the courts have acted in assessing defendants' fees against plaintiffs. When the dynamics of the rule are contemplated, it
seems unlikely to be an efficient selector of suits. The amounts of defendants'
attorneys' fees are often higher than the value of shares required to escape the
requirement. For example, a holder of $5,000 worth of shares might have to risk
incurring a $50,000 assessment to assert his own and his fellow-shareholders' rights.
Considering the unpredictability of litigation outcomes, a normally prudent
investor would probably refrain from filing even a very plausible complaint if
required to post security for defendants' expenses.
The only shareholder who would be likely to risk posting security would be one
who had a chance of gaining in some other role. A shareholder whose attorney is
her son, for example, might be willing to risk a $50,000 security deposit in hope of
her son's winning $1,000,000.
E.

Winnowing by Assessments against Plaintiffs' Attorneys
As a deterrent against unproductive litigation, assessments against offending

(CCH) 99,038 (N.D. Ga. 1982), where fees were assessed against two plaintiffs, of whom one was not a
shareholder and the other had not read the complaint.
72.

See, e.g., Jones, Resolution, supra note 3, at 567.

73. See Dykstra,supra note 1, at 88-89 & n.96, citing security for expenses statutes in Maryland (1945),
New Jersey (1945), Pennsylvania (1945), Wisconsin (1945), California (1949), North Dakota (1960), Colorado (1963), Nebraska (1963), Arkansas (1966), Florida (1966) Texas (1966), and Washington (1966).
74. For a more cynical view that the legislation was designed to deter all suits by small shareholders,
see Hornstein, supra note 5.
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attorneys have attained a sudden prominence in recent years. 75 Assessments have
unique potential for controlling detrimental derivative suits. Like limitations on
fee awards, they serve to motivate the individuals-attorneys-most likely to make
the crucial decisions about filing and maintaining suits. Unlike limitations of
awards, they serve primarily to deter the suits that ought to be eliminated without
necessarily reducing incentives for the ones that ought to be preserved. We will
examine how assessments might be used to deter unproductive derivative suits and
then inquire as to what changes in the law would be required to authorize the
making of assessments for this purpose.
1. A Program for Assessments Against Plainti" Attorneys. The effectiveness of
assessing expenses against plaintiffs' attorneys will depend on the criteria of assessment. The criteria should be designed to deter the useless suits without scaring
away the useful ones. Critical elements will include the measure of net benefits and
the probability of the benefits occurring.
a.

The measures of benefit.

The benefit with which the judge is concerned in

assessing fees against plaintiffs' attorneys should be the prospective benefit to
society. This is quite a different matter from the benefits considered in various
76
other connections.
It is different, first of all, from the benefit to the corporation, as measured in
awarding fees to successful plaintiffs' attorneys. That benefit is measured by
77
results; attorneys receive some share of what they have actually produced.
Assessments, on the contrary, should be based on what was foreseeable to the attorneys when they filed or maintained the suits.
Prospective social benefit is also different from the best interests of the corporation, which are considered by disinterested directors in deciding whether to move
for dismissal of a derivative suit. 7 8 It is different partly because judges will view,
much more objectively than directors, the need for outside intervention to correct
mismanagement. More fundamentally, it is different because social benefits
include admonitory effects that reverberate through hundreds or thousands of corporations in addition to the one involved in the suit.
The test of prospective social benefit is more easily met than the test of the
benefit realized by the represented corporation or the test of best interests of the
corporation, but it is a stricter test than is required to survive a defendant's motion
for dismissal or summary judgment. If a complaint charges illegal behavior, it will
survive a motion for dismissal or summary judgment even though the interests of
75. See Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) and numerous casenotes on it; Ryan, Hazards of
Vexatious Conduct in Lztgattion, 30 DEF. L.J. 123, 127-40 (1981); Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the JudicialProcess, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619, 623-36 (1977); Note, Attorneys'Liabilty to Clients'
Adversaresfor Instituting Frivolous Lawsuits: A Reassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 775 (1979).
76. Compare Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (costs and benefits of maintaining
suit); see supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
77.

Leubsdorf, supra note 68; cf Dewees, Prichard & Trebilcock, An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee

Rulesfor Class Actions, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1981).
78. Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979): Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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the corporation are unlikely to be advanced by the suit. 79 This is probably the
principle that inspired some of the suits challenging questionable foreign payments.80 In some of those cases, the payments had already been reported to the
SEC so that the Commission or the U.S. Department of Justice could be expected
to take any measures that would be in the public interest. Under such circumstances, the test of prospective social benefit would lead to assessing plaintiffs'
attorneys with some of the expenses of defendants.
A puzzling problem is the weight that should be given to unreasonable defense
expenditures. There is no doubt that the essential costs of attorneys who advise
and appear for the represented corporation and for the real defendants should be
considered. Even if the defendants are liable, they need counsel to participate in
determining the extent of their liability. The difficulty arises when defendants
incur large expenses in denying liability that is eventually proved and engaging in
dilatory or vexatious tactics of obstruction. Are plaintiffs' attorneys bound to
weigh these costs against benefits in deciding whether to file a derivative suit?
The better answer seems to be the affirmative one. Plaintiffs' attorneys must
make their decisions in view of the imperfect system of justice that exists. If they
can reasonably foresee that more money will be spent in litigation than will be
gained-even when the broader social effects are included-the suit should not be
filed.
b. The probability of benefit. Assuming that plaintiffs' attorneys can foresee a
probability of social benefit from a derivative suit, the question arises, what degree
of probability should move them to action? Is it a virtual certainty, a preponderance of likelihood, or only a realistic possibility? These are vague measures at best,
but a judge who is charged with assessing fees must have some degree of
probability as a standard. Here again, the appropriate degree of probability is
quite different from that employed for other purposes.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association, litigation is permissible when "there is a basis . . .that is not frivolous."' '
The Model Rule is framed in contemplation of an action taken under the control
and direction of a client; it is based on the principle that a lawyer should advance
82
claims that his client wants to assert even when they are long shots.
But in a derivative suit, the persons most affected are the corporation and its
passive shareholders. Their resources will be consumed by the suit whether it wins
or loses. But they do not control and direct the suit. The corporation opposes the
79. Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (alleged illegal campaign contribution in failure to sue Democratic National Committee for delinquent telephone account).
80. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (Final Draft 1982), reprintedin 68 A.B.A. J.,
pullout supplement (Nov. 1982).
82. The Rule's contemplation of client control is revealed in the accompanying comment: "Such
action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail.
The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring a person ... ." d Rule 3.1 comment.

Page 269: Winter 19841

WINNOWING DERIVATIVE SUITS

suit, and the nonsuing shareholders are silent. 3 Thus, derivative suits should have
firmer bases than set forth in the Model Rule.
Attorneys who assert the rights of others, at the others' expense and against or
without their will, should have more than a nonfrivolous basis for proceeding. At
a minimum, the probability of winning on the law and facts should be substantial.
An appropriate measure might be a better-than-even chance of prevailing on the
issues and producing a net social benefit. When attorneys subject the assets of
involuntary clients to the costs of derivative suits with inadequate bases for
believing that the results will be beneficial, they should be assessed some of the
costs that they have precipitated.
c. The product of probabihty times benefit. Mathematical modelers will suggest
that a low probability of success should be balanced against a high ratio of benefit
to cost in the event of success.8 4 On this supposition, a 1-to-10 chance of succeeding should be multiplied by a 20-to-I ratio of benefit to cost, yielding a benefit
probability of 2 to 1.
This rationalization of forlorn causes should be rejected. In practice, estimates
of cost-benefit ratios and of probabilities are crude at best; their inherent inaccuracies should not be aggravated by multiplication. Even if estimates were accurate,
application of the norm would mean that nine corporations would be subjected to
unsuccessful suits in order that one should reap the big reward. This result is
unfair to the constituents of the nine victims of unsuccessful suits.
d. The amounts of assessments. To achieve the objectives of assessments against
attorneys, the amounts of assessments should not be determined by a fixed
formula. If the judge finds that a suit was unjustified, he should not be obliged to
assess the entire defense costs against plaintiffs' attorneys. If obliged to do so, he
would probably decide against making any assessment at all. Judges will not
saddle erring attorneys with liabilities that would consume their entire incomes for
years to come. They will be particularly reluctant when assessments against attorneys are novel and punish conduct that is not condemned by rules of ethics.
Judges should be free to impose fractions of defendants' expenses that are sufficient
to serve as warnings.
2. Legal Groundsfor Assessments Against Attorneys. In a few areas of law other than
derivative suits, assessments of defendants' attorneys' fees against plaintiffs' attorneys are firmly established.
a. Express authorization. A source of specific statutory authorization for assessments against attorneys is section 1927 of the Judiciary title of the United States
Code. 85 It authorizes federal courts to require attorneys "to satisfy personally...
83. Cf
84. Cf
note 12.
85. 28
1154, 1156

Dawson, supra note 59, at 857.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cer. demed, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983), quoted supra
U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. IV 1980). Before a recent amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 2, 94 Stat.
(1980), section 1927 authorized the assessment of taxable costs but not of attorney fees.
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excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees" that are caused unreasonably and vexatiously by multiplication of proceedings. 86 One example of "multiplication" was
failure to be prepared for trial after agreeing on a date;8 7 another was confusing
the evidence by misreading depositions, questioning witnesses on documents that
88
a
had not been admitted, and interposing meritless objections to interrogations;
9
third was a groundless motion to disqualify an opposing attorney.
Another specific authorization for fee assessments against attorneys is found in
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to pretrial discovery.
Motions to compel answers, failures to respond, and failures to appear may be
punished by assessments against parties or against the attorneys who advise the
90
The courts have
parties when the steps taken were not substantially justified.
employed the provision to assess expenses and fees against attorneys in a number
of cases involving flagrant and repeated failures to comply with proper discovery
procedures. 9' The rule has no application to attorney misconduct in other
settings.
The newest addition to express judicial authority for assessing fees against
attorneys is a 1983 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 92 The Rule makes attorneys guarantors of reasonable bases for the pleadings
they file. The amendment reinforces the rule both with respect to its substantive
requirements and the sanctions for its enforcement. With respect to substance, the
former requirement of belief in "good ground to support" the pleading is amplified
to require belief "formed after reasonable inquiry [that the pleading] is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. . .

."

With respect to sanc-

tions, the former authorization of "appropriate disciplinary action" has been
expanded to cover "an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing .

. . ."

The amendments codify the holding of a reported decision

under the old rule which assessed expenses against an attorney who filed in a fed93
eral court a claim over which the court clearly had no jurisdiction.
b. Imphed authorization. An implication of authority to make assessments
against attorneys has been found in a federal appellate rule expressly allowing
94
awards of damages to parties against whom frivolous appeals have been filed.
The rule does not say who shall be assessed for the award, but the courts have
Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757-63 (1980). For a review of cases under the section before the
amendment, see Comment, supra note 75, at 623-29.
86.
87.
88.
89.

28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1961).
Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969).
North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

90.

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

91.
92.
93.

Cases are collected and reviewed in Comment, supra note 75, at 629-33.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (as amended Apr. 28, 1983, 51 U.S.L.W. 4501).
Textor v. Board of Regents, 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D. Il. 1980).

94.

FED. R. App. P. 38.
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determined that attorneys, as well as parties, are subject to assessments. 9 5
However, a statutory authorization to assess attorneys' fees against parties does
not ordinarily imply authorization to assess them against opposing attorneys. The
argument for this implication was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court in the
1980 decision of Roadway Express v. Pzper. 96 Piper sued under civil rights provisions
97
which authorized assessment of the winner's attorneys' fees against the loser.
When Piper's claim was found to be without basis, Roadway moved for an assessment against Piper's attorneys. The Court rejected the civil rights acts as bases of
assessment against attorneys, 98 although it found another basis in the fundamental powers of courts.9 9
c. Inherent power of courts. The Supreme Court in Roadway Express v. Pper
announced the inherent right of a court to assess expenses (including attorneys'
fees) of one party against the attorneys for the other party as a facet of a court's
powers of discipline over the attorneys practicing before it. 10 0 The occasion for
such an assessment is the filing of a suit or motion "in bad faith." 10
' 1 The Court in
Roadway, without analyzing the meaning of the term remanded the case to the
0 2
district court for a determination of whether the attorneys acted "in bad faith."'
The lower court had found that the plaintiffs' attorneys had filed a class suit rather
than an individual one without the knowledge of their clients and had inadequately prosecuted the suit, being guilty of deliberate inaction. 0 3 These acts,
0 4
however, were not necessarily proof of bad faith.
3. The Need for New Law. Assessments against attorneys on the grounds presently recognized do not effectively deter useless derivative suits. Some of the
grounds are narrowly confined to particular procedures-discovery and appeals.
Others have generally been confined to particular procedures within a suitmotions, responses, and appearances-rather than to suits themselves. In a rare
case in which the filing of the suit itself was found to be abusive, there was a total
05
lack of jurisdiction rather than an unsupported theory or a lack of evidence.
Finally, even the Roadway standard of "in bad faith" effects little deterrence, since
the standard for bad faith is often very subjective.
Effective control of derivative suits by assessments against attorneys will
require a more demanding standard for the suits. Not only must they be in good
95. See, e.g., United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). The statute involved in Roadway was promptly amended to authorize assessments of attorney fees, see supra note 85, but the ruling against automatic inclusion of attorney fees within
"costs" remains presumably valid with respect to other statutes.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
98. 447 U.S. at 757-63 (1980).
99. Id at 764-67.
100. Id
101. Id at 766.
102. Id; cf. Ryan, supra note 75, at 136-37.
103. 447 U.S. 752, 755-56 (citing Monk v. Roadway Express, 73 F.R.D. 411, 414, 417 (W.D. La.
1977)).
104. Id at 767.
105. Textor v. Board of Regents, 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D. III. 1980).
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faith and with basis, but they must have a reasonable chance of producing a net
benefit.
This standard is unlikely to evolve by judicial decision. Case law on abusive
litigation is concerned primarily with what a lawyer may permissibly do to carry
out a client's wishes. To articulate a radically different standard for derivative
suits would require a leap too long for judicial tradition.
Neither Congress nor a state legislature is likely to adopt legislation that would
impose a heavier responsibility on attorneys filing derivative suits. Although there
are pressure groups who are interested in legislation to control derivative suits,
none of them is likely to opt for this type of solution.
The most conspicuous wave of legislation against derivative suits, which blossomed in the security-for-expenses statutes of the 1940's, was instigated by the New
York Chamber of Commerce. 10 6 As we have seen, the legislation that the
Chamber supported was not valuable in separating the meritorious from the meritless suits; rather, it sought to impose forbidding burdens on the large majority of
shareholders. The Chamber of Commerce would be unlikely to favor legislation
that would deter only the small fraction of suits that have minimal grounds.
A second group that has had a major influence on corporation laws is the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association. It has drafted a widely copied model act,
which requires contemporaneous ownership and which for many years authorized
orders to post security for expenses. 0 7 The recent proposal to eliminate the provision on security for expenses' 0 8 indicates that the Corporate Laws Committee is
now reasonably neutral on derivative suits. The Committee's membership
includes some lawyers who frequently file derivative suits as well as lawyers who
defend against them. This membership is unlikely to unite in putting the burden
of controlling derivative suits on plaintiffs' lawyers. If it did, it would encounter
the opposition of other bar association committees.
A third group that has turned its attention to the regulation of derivative suits
is the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Prnci'plesof CorporateGovernance and Structure. 109 Its 1982 draft of rules for derivative suits contains a number of devices that
are designed to separate the productive from the wasteful. It renounces security
for expenses" 0 and palliates the contemporary ownership rule.'
It refines the
measures to be used in awarding fees to plaintiffs' attorneys 1 2 and in dismissing
suits on motion of independent directors."13 Most significantly for the present con106.

House, supra note 5.

107.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 49 (1979).

108. Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, Proposed Revi ions of the Model Business CorporationAct Affecting Actions by Shareholders, 37
Bus. LAW. 261, 265-66 (1981).
109.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:

RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMEN-

DATIONS §§ 701-707 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES]. For a detailed critique of

this draft, see Cox, supra note 5, at 994-1007.
110. PRINCIPLES, supra note 109, § 7.02(d).
111. Id § 7.02(a).
112. Id § 7.07(a).
113. Id § 7.03.
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text, it expressly authorizes assessments against attorneys on either side (as well as
against parties) for proceedings "in bad faith or without reasonable cause.1 114 But
attorneys are not made responsible for estimates of the cost-benefit balance; this is
1 5
to be considered only by directors in deciding whether to move to dismiss a suit. 1
At this writing, the final content of the ALI principles cannot be foreseen. The
draft appears to have encountered substantial internal resistance." 16
In federal courts, nonmeritorious suits are likely to be warded off by the recent
amendment of Rule 11." 17 A rigorous application of the rule to derivative suits
would fit with the Court's demonstrated coolness toward class actions'" 8 and the
Chief Justice's concern with diminishing the caseloads of federal courts. 119 However, federal restrictions alone are likely to have very little effect on the aggregate
burden that derivative suits impose on corporations. If the federal restrictions are
not matched by state rules, the cases will merely move from federal to state courts.
State courts are less willing to exclude suitors. This tendency exists partly
because they, unlike federal courts, cannot readily dismiss suits with the thought
that the claims can be brought in other courts. State courts are themselves the
"other courts." Furthermore, state judges are commonly less antipathetic than are
federal judges to the litigation explosion. This is probably because their shorter
tenure and elective positions make them more responsive to the demands of the
organized bar and of the mass of voters.
Some states already have court rules or civil procedure statutes that authorize
assessments against attorneys for violations of rules 120 or for conducting vexatious
litigation,' 2 1 and at least one state makes assessments for misconduct under the
court's inherent power to discipline attorneys. 2 2 As in the federal courts, an
enlarged conception of the scope of these sanctions would be required to use them
as winnowers of shareholders' derivative suits.

114. Id. § 7.02(e)(ii). This and other provisions of the draft were foreshadowed by Professors Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 334.
115. PRINCIPLES, supra note 109, § 7.03.
116. This resistance may be inferred from the remarks of Roswell B. Perkins, Background and Status of
ALl Corporate Governance Project, made at a forum of the New York City Bar Association (Mar. 14, 1983)
(reproduced and circulated to ALI members in a memorandum dated April 5, 1983). The drafting committee made no presentation at the 1983 ALI annual meeting, although earlier plans had contemplated
submission of a draft on that occasion.
117. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
118. A series of decisions has added impediments to direct class actions. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (class plaintiff must bear the expense of notifying other class members); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (no aggregation of separate and distinct claims to meet the federal jurisdictional threshold). "Frankenstein monster" was the term applied by one federal judge to a particular class
action, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting), rev'd,
417 U.S. 156 (1974), and by another to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which regulates
class actions. San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435, 436 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
119. See, e.g., Warren, Address, 46 A.L.I. PROC. 2 (1969).
120. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37 (discovery sanctions); OR. R. Crv. P. 46B(3) (discovery sanctions);
WASH. DISCIPLINARY R. Arrys. 7.1.
121. See CAL. R. CT. 26 (a) (frivolous appeals).
122. Gottlieb v. Edelstein, 84 Misc. 2d 1053, 375 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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V
AFTERTHOUGHTS

The analysis in the foregoing pages suggests that the devices that are currently
most used for controlling derivative suits are inefficient. They are likely to deter or
defeat meritorious suits while they fail to exclude suits that are maintained for
harassment. Courts could winnow better if they would abandon the devices of
security for expenses, contemporaneous ownership, and dismissal on motion of
independent directors and would rely instead on assessments against plaintiffs'
attorneys.
The reader's response to this contention will probably depend less on the credibility of the analysis presented than on preferences which the article has not
articulated. The choice is basically between controlling unproductive activities of
business managers by judicial intervention or leaving these activities to the regime
of organizational autonomy. Under one model, judicial intervention is relied on to
restrain abuses of power by executives and abuses of process by plaintiffs' attorneys. Under the other, executives are insulated against judicial intervention in all
but the most flagrant cases, and abuses of process are deterred by the remoteness of
a complainant's chance of winning.
Which model one prefers will depend in large part on how well one thinks the
corporate world operates without intervention. Some people believe that the corporate world operates well enough with very little intervention; others see a need
to increase the pressure for higher standards of management.
The choice will depend also on how confident one is that judges and juries will
reach the right answers. If courts are likely to assess liabilities against the wrong
managers or assess expenses against the wrong attorneys, more harm than good
may be done by giving them the power to do so.
At stake is not only the profitability of equity investments, or even the efficiency of business enterprises, but the credibility of business management. If managers are perceived as ripping off their shareholders with impunity, they will be
suspected of acting with even less regard for employees, customers, and neighbors;
pervasive regulation will continue its creeping conquest. If the legal system is seen
as enforcing integrity at the managerial level, a modicum of freedom in enterprise
will have a better chance of surviving.

